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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an important international organization. In 1995, the 
WTO replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was founded in 
1948. One aim of the WTO is to liberalize international trade on a reciprocal basis. To achieve 
this aim, the WTO has completed eight rounds of trade negotiations that have substantially 
lowered tariffs and other trade barriers. Standard economic theory, however, calls for unilateral 
trade liberalization. Small countries, under perfectly competitive markets, have no incentive to 
impose tariffs. Countries should therefore unilaterally liberalize international trade, because 
doing so serves their own interests. This makes reciprocal trade liberalization or trade 
agreements unnecessary. Consequently, the gains of and reasons for WTO trade agreements 
have been disputed. 
 
The main theory of the WTO is the terms of trade theory, originally proposed by Johnson 
(1953–1954) and more recently developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). This theory relies on 
the optimal tariff argument: In a two-country model, a large country has an incentive to improve 
its terms of trade by imposing a tariff. This tariff is likely to lead to retaliation by the other 
country. When both countries impose tariffs, no individual country can improve its terms of 
trade at the expense of its neighbor. Tariffs, however, reduce international trade and output in 
both countries. The purpose of a trade agreement, based on reciprocal trade liberalization, is to 
resolve the prisoner’s dilemma driven by manipulating the terms of trade. The recent empirical 
literature (Broda et al. 2008 and Bagwell and Staiger 2011) supports the relevance of the terms 
of trade theory.  
 
In a seminal work, Eaton and Kortum (2002) developed a new trade theory that incorporates 
Ricardian trade into a general equilibrium framework. Their multi-country model can be 
calibrated convincingly, and can consequently quantify the welfare gains of unilateral and 
multilateral trade liberalization. Eaton and Kortum found that a unilateral tariff removal by the 
United States reduces welfare in that country, due a deterioration of the terms of trade, while all 
other countries benefit. They showed that the multilateral elimination of 5% tariffs improves 
welfare (in case of immobile labor) by less than 0.5%. 
 
Since the publication of Eaton and Kortum (2002), a strand of the trade literature has focused on 
quantifying the welfare benefits of trade liberalization. Caliendo and Parro (2015), for example, 
studied the welfare effects of tariff reductions caused by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). They found that NAFTA has increased welfare on average by 0.42%. 
Ossa (2014) analyzed the welfare effects of WTO trade agreements in a framework that features 
the terms of trade effect, the production relocation effect and the political economy effects. He 
calibrated the multi-country model to match the features of seven countries and regions (Brazil, 
China, the European Union, India, Japan, the United States and the rest of the world). He found 
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that the average welfare gain of a WTO trade agreement, which eliminates actual tariffs, is 
0.5%. 
 
The main innovation of our paper is to explore the quantitative effects of trade liberalization in a 
setup that is non-standard from the traditional trade policy point of view. This paper uses a New 
Keynesian two-country model with a fixed number of imperfectly competitive firms and price 
rigidities to analyze the consequences of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization. We use 
a numerical analysis of the model for symmetric countries, with parameters chosen to reflect 
existing tariff rates and import-to-GDP ratios in the OECD countries, to derive the main results.1 
 
The first result is that a unilateral tariff reduction reduces welfare. Earlier work using similar 
macro models (Fender and Yip 2000, and Reitz and Slopek 2005) suggests an ambiguous 
relationship between tariffs and welfare in the long term. We argue that, under plausible 
parameter combinations of the key parameter values of the models, unilateral trade 
liberalization is welfare decreasing. This result is important to establish a prisoner’s dilemma 
for tariff setting at the relevant parameter values.  
 
The second main result is that the welfare gains of WTO trade agreements are substantial. 
Following the method of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), we measure the value of a WTO 
trade agreement as the percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay for a 
trade agreement in order to remain as well off with the trade agreement case as without it. Our 
results shows that for the realistic parameter combinations of the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply2 and the elasticity of substitution between two goods produced in the same country 
(within-country substitutability), the discounted present value of the welfare gain of a WTO 
trade agreement, which cuts tariffs by one percentage point, is as high as 0.5% to 2% of initial 
consumption. In addition, the complete elimination of initial 4% tariffs would cause even 
greater welfare gains. Therefore, the welfare effects of multilateral trade liberalization are 
substantially larger in our New Keynesian model than in the trade models of Eaton and Kortum 
(2002), Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2014). Our results imply that WTO agreements 
are of high value. The policy implication of this is that completion of the Doha Round should be 
a high priority. 
 
The paper uses two innovations, relative to the models that have been used in the literature on 
trade agreements (Eaton and Kortum 2002, Caliendo and Parro 2015 and Ossa 2014), that may 
explain the huge quantitative difference in the results. The first innovation is to introduce 
transitional dynamics with the introduction of staggered price setting. We show that the 
                                                 
1 We do not attempt to calculate optimal tariffs. We assume that trade liberalization begins at factual tariff rates.  
2 The Frisch elasticity is the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage, holding the marginal utility of 
wealth constant. 
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introduction of staggered price setting increases the value of a trade agreement. The intuition is 
that sticky prices make the real wage temporarily higher, which, given a Frisch elasticity, 
increases labor supply. This brings the economy temporarily closer to the efficient level of 
consumption and increases welfare. Staggered price setting, however, cannot account for the 
differences in the results, because it only slightly increases the value of a trade agreement. 
 
The second and main innovation this paper uses is to alter the underlying steady state of the 
trade models by introducing endogenous labor supply and a different market structure from the 
one usually assumed. We show that the presence of imperfect substitutability between goods 
within the same country is a key determinant of our main results. In the quantitative 
macroeconomics literature, within-country substitutability is virtually always set between 6 and 
20. In the trade models, which have been used in the literature on trade agreements, competition 
within the industry is perfect, implying very high within-country substitutability. In our macro 
model, the lower within-country substitutability is, the lower the initial level of output is; the 
lower the initial level of output is, the more an increase in output and consumption (of given 
size) increases welfare. Therefore, the gains of trade agreement depend significantly on the 
degree of within-country substitutability. 
 
The public economics and macroeconomics literature has shown that the consequences of 
taxation on the magnitude of aggregate labor supply are central to optimal tax policy. Trade 
models that have been used to quantify the gains of multilateral tariff reductions, however, 
typically assume that utility depends solely on consumption, making the labor supply decision 
of households exogenous. We show that the higher the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is, the 
larger the welfare gains of multilateral trade liberalization. If the Frisch elasticity is high, 
households respond to a tariff reduction by further increasing their labor supply. This brings 
consumption and output of an imperfectly competitive economy closer to their efficient levels, 
thereby increasing welfare. 
 
We show that the combination of elastic labor supply and imperfect competition within the 
country/industry (i.e., low within-country substitutability) accounts for the huge quantitative 
difference between our results and those of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo and Parro 
(2015) and Ossa (2014). We show that for the realistic parameter combinations of the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply and within-country substitutability, the welfare gains of WTO trade 
agreements are much larger than the new trade models have found. On the other hand, our 
results are consistent with theirs when we set the parameters of the model to be roughly 
consistent with their assumptions of exogenous labor supply and perfect competition within 
industry (i.e., when we assume a very low Frisch elasticity and very high within-country 
substitutability). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 
discusses the parameterization, Section 4 studies the international effects of unilateral trade 
liberalization, Section 5 analyzes the value of multilateral trade agreements and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
II.   THE MODEL 
In this section, we develop a New Keynesian two-country model that incorporates distortionary 
import tariffs. The model is similar to those presented in Fender and Yip (2000) and Reitz and 
Slopek (2005). Fender and Yip (2000) analyze the effects of a permanent tariff under flexible 
prices without current account dynamics. Reitz and Slopek (2005) extend the model of Fender 
and Yip (2000) by introducing current account adjustments and sticky prices in the form of 
single-period price rigidities. 
 
The empirical evidence points out that the elasticity of substitution between two goods produced 
in different countries (cross-country substitutability) is much smaller than the elasticity of 
substitution between two goods produced in the same country (within-country substitutability). 
Unlike the previous literature, we assume that cross-country substitutability can differ from 
within-country substitutability. Another unrealistic assumption in Fender and Yip (2000) and 
Reitz and Slopek (2005) is that, for countries of equal size, their share of imports relative to 
output is 50%. To match the empirical observed import-to-output ratio, we assume (exogenous) 
a home bias in consumption (in addition to an endogenous home bias due to tariffs). 
 
Additional differences relative to the existing literature are that we use Calvo-pricing, log-
linearize the model around non-zero tariffs, and consider a tariff reduction. Following the idea 
of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), we measure the welfare benefit as a percentage of 
consumption that the household is willing to pay for a tariff reduction, while Fender and Yip 
(2000) and Reitz and Slopek (2005) calculate the percent change in utility. Finally, our main 
focus is on the quantitative gains of multilateral trade liberalization, whereas the previous 
literature has focused solely unilateral trade liberalization. 
 
The world economy consists of two countries: home and foreign. Firms and households are 
indexed by ]1,0[z . A fraction n (1-n) of households and firms are located in the domestic 
(foreign) country. We assume that the domestic (foreign) country imposes an ad valorem tariff 
on all foreign (domestically) produced goods. In what follows, we present the equations for the 
domestic country. Unless explicitly discussed, foreign equations are symmetric to domestic 
ones. 
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A.   Households 
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the representative domestic 
household is given by 
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where 10    is the discount factor, tC is a consumption index,  is a positive parameter, tM  
is nominal money balances, 0  is the inverse of the consumption elasticity of money 
demand, and sP  is the price index. The expression )(P denotes the fact that the price index is a 
function of the tariff  . The household’s labor supply is denoted by )(zlt  and the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply is . As shown later in this paper, the endogeneity of labor supply is a 
key feature of the model. 
 
The overall consumption index takes into account the Armington element, in which 
international trade takes place because goods are differentiated by the country of origin. It is 
given by 
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where htC  (
f
tC ) is an index of domestic (foreign) goods and ρ > 0 is cross-country 
substitutability.  n )10(    denotes the share of domestic goods in the consumption 
basket; it depends on the relative size of the home country (n) and parameter α, which captures 
the degree of home bias in consumption. Home bias in consumption requires α > 1. The 
consumption of domestic and foreign goods htC and 
f
tC are aggregates of the different brands of 
domestic and foreign goods:  
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where )(zcht ( )(zc
f
t ) is the consumption of differentiated domestic (foreign) good z by the 
representative domestic household, and θ > 1 is within-country substitutability. 
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The foreign consumption index is 
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where asterisks indicate consumption by the representative foreign household. 
**  n
)10( *    denotes the share of domestic goods in the foreign consumption basket, and home 
bias requires α* < 1. 
 
We assume that the domestic (foreign) country imposes a tariff on all foreign (domestically) 
produced goods. Given the consumption indexes (2), (3) and (4), the optimal allocation of 
consumption between different types of goods is governed by the following demand functions: 
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)(* zc ht  ))((
* zc ft  denotes the consumption of the differentiated domestic (foreign) good z by the 
representative foreign household. The demand functions show that domestic households allocate 
their total consumption tC between domestic and foreign baskets 
h
tC  and , by taking into 
consideration relative prices (including tariffs), cross-country substitutability, and the degree of 
home bias. Subsequently, domestic households allocate their consumption of domestic and 
foreign goods across differentiated brands according to relative prices and within-country 
substitutability.  
 
The domestic currency price of domestic and foreign goods is denoted by )(zpht  and )(zp
f
t , 
respectively. htP  and 
f
tP  are, respectively, the price indexes that correspond to domestic and 
foreign aggregate consumption baskets htC  and 
f
tC . All of these price indexes are expressed in 
terms of the local currency. Corresponding foreign currency price indexes are denoted by an 
asterisk. For instance, )(* zp ht  is the foreign currency price of a differentiated domestic brand. 
h
tP  and 
f
tP  are defined as 
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These equations define the overall domestic price index as follows 
 
      1 111 ))()(1()()( fthtt PPP .      (7) 
 
The corresponding foreign indexes are defined in an analogous way. As in Fender and Yip 
(2000), the law of one price holds for all producer prices. Tariffs, however, imply that the law of 
one price does not hold for consumer prices. 
 
The budget constraint of the domestic household is given by  
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D is the holding of nominal bonds (denominated in domestic currency),  is the price of a bond 
(the inverse of one plus the nominal interest rate), tw  is the nominal wage,  is nominal 
dividends (profits), and tT  denotes real transfers from the government. Since the bond is 
denominated in the domestic currency, the budget constraint of the foreign household is  
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where tS  is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of the foreign currency expressed in 
the domestic currency. A global asset-market clearing condition requires that 
0)1( *  tt DnnD . 
 
Domestic households maximize (1) subject to (8). The first order conditions are  
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Equations (9) and (10) are Euler consumption equations. Equations (11) and (12) govern the 
optimal labor supply. They show that the labor supply is an increasing function of the real wage 
and a decreasing function of consumption. In addition, tariffs reduce labor supply through their 
impact on prices. Equations (13) and (14) show that the demand for money is an increasing 
function of consumption and a decreasing function of the interest rate.  
 
B.   The Government  
We abstract from government spending and assume that the government refunds tariff and 
seignorage revenues to households in a lump-sum manner.3 Taking into account symmetry 
across households, the government budget constraint in per-capita terms can be expressed as 
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In equation (15), the first term on the right hand side denotes revenue from import tariffs that 
depend on the tariff rate, consumption of foreign goods by domestic households and their price 
(in the domestic currency). 
  
Similarly, the foreign tariff revenue ( *R ) from import tariffs can be shown to be equal to 
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The domestic tariff rate follows an AR(1) process 
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3 Abstracting from seignorage in practice, however, we keep the money supply constant. 
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where  1,0 and t  is a zero mean white-noise process representing an unexpected change in 
the tariff tax rate. Percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the subscript 
zero) are denoted by hats (for example: 
0
ˆ 

d
d t
t  ). We assume that tariff changes are 
permanent, so we set the persistency parameter )(  to 1. The parameter t  serves to model 
policy shifts. 
 
C.   Firms 
Technology and Profits 
All firms produce differentiated goods with a production function  
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where )(zyt is the output of firm z , and )(zlt  is the labor input firm z uses. 
 
The domestic firm maximizes its profits  
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taking into account the production function (16) and the demand curve for its goods 
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Using equations (16) and (18), domestic profits can be expressed as  
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The profits of the representative foreign firm can be expressed as 
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Price Setting 
In the absence of price rigidities, the domestic firm would maximize equation (19) with respect 
to )(zpht . The solution is 
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Equation (21) shows that, without price rigidities, the price is a constant mark-up, determined 
by within-country substitutability, over the marginal cost.  
 
Based on the idea of Calvo (1983), we assume that each firm can reset its prices with a 
probability of 1  in any given period, independently of the time elapsed since the last 
adjustment and of other firms. The representative domestic firm seeks to maximize 
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where st ,  is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s. The result of this 
maximization problem is 
 









ts
sst
ts
ts
tsst
ts
t
Q
wQ
zp
,
,
)
1
()(



 ,       (22) 
 
where ***
*
*
*
)1(
)(
)(
)(
)1(
)(
1
t
tt
h
tt
h
tt
t
t
t
h
t
h
t
t CnPS
PS
PS
C
P
P
P
Q 








 





. 
 
The log-linear version of equation (22) can be expressed as 
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Equation (23) shows that the change in the optimal price is a weighted average of the changes in 
current and future marginal costs. 
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D.   The Consolidated Budget Constraint 
The consolidated budget constraint for the domestic economy is derived by substituting 
equations (15) and (17) into equation (7) and can be expressed as 
 
)()(1 zyzpDDCP t
h
tttttt    .       (24) 
 
In equation (24), tP is the domestic price index without tariffs. The intuition for the dependence 
of the consolidated budget constraint on the price without taxes is that tariff revenue is a within-
country transfer. tP is defined as 
 
      1 111 ))(1()( fthtt PPP ,       (25) 
 
where htP  is identical to equation (5), and
f
tP  is 
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Taking into account the global asset-market-clearing condition, the consolidated budget 
constraint of the foreign economy, can be expressed as 
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In this equation, *tP is the foreign price index without tariffs. 
E.   The Initial Steady State 
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state where initial net foreign assets are 
zero )0( 0 D . Equation (24) therefore implies that 00 yC  . Equations (11), (16) and (21) thus 
imply that the initial level of employment and output is  
 
  

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


 
P
zpzyzl .       (27) 
 
Equation (27) shows that the level of output depends on tariffs and the degree of imperfect 
competition (within-country substitutability). Tariffs reduce the steady-state level of the labor 
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supply through their impact on prices. The higher the degree of imperfect competition, the 
lower the level of output. Equilibrium is defined as sequences of variables that clear the labor, 
goods and money markets in each country in each period and satisfy intertemporal budget 
constraints and pricing rules. 
 
III.   PARAMETERIZATION 
The countries are assumed to be of equal size, so n is set to 0.5. We interpret periods as quarters 
and set the discount factor   to 0.99. The consumption elasticity of money demand )1(  is set 
to 1, a value commonly used in the literature. This value is consistent with the empirical 
estimates of Mankiw and Summers (1986). 
 
Table 2. Parameterization of the Model 
Parameter Baseline value [range of 
parameters] 
Description 
  0.99 Discount factor 
  1 Inverse of the consumption 
elasticity of money demand 
  11 [6-100] Within-country 
substitutability 
  2 [0.5-11] Cross-country 
substitutability 
  0.75 [0-0.75] Calvo parameter 
n 0.5 Relative size of the domestic 
economy 
  0.04 [0.02-0.06] Initial tariff rate 
  1 Persistence of a tariff tax 
shock 
  -0.25 Size of a tariff shock 
α 1.47 [1.37-1.68] Home bias parameter 
α* 0.53 [0.42-0.63] Home bias parameter 
  1 [0.1-2] Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply 
 
Calvo parameter (γ) affects the strength and duration of the expenditure switching effect of a 
nominal exchange rate change. We therefore set the parameter to match the evidence for the 
price rigidities of internationally traded goods. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) find that the trade-
weighted median price duration of internationally traded goods is roughly one year. Based on 
this, we set γ to 0.75. This implies that an average delay of four periods (one year) between 
price adjustments. 
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Based on the estimates of Basu and Fernald (1997), we set within-country substitutability θ to 
11. This implies a 10% markup over the marginal cost in the steady state (recall equation (21)). 
This is within the 5 to 20 range typically used in the macro literature. It is worth noting that 
within-country substitutability affects only the initial steady state and welfare results, not the 
response of endogenous variables. Equation (27) shows that with low within-country 
substitutability, the initial level of output and employment would be small. If within-country 
substitutability is too low, trade liberalization could have unrealistically strong welfare effects. 
However, our benchmark parameterization also implies that within-country substitutability is 
lower than the one implicitly assumed in trade models, which assume perfect competition with 
industry.  
 
The choice of a parameter value for cross-country substitutability deserves a more detailed 
explanation, because the literature on international economics literature has shown that results 
can depend on it. In a New Keynesian model, the parameter is potentially even more important, 
because it influences the strength of the expenditure switching effect. 
 
The empirical literature shows a wide range of estimates for cross-country substitutability. 
Empirical estimates of it that use macroeconomic data and business-cycles models are typically 
small; estimates are much higher with microeconomic data and trade models. Bergin (2006), for 
instance, finds that cross-country substitutability is 1.1, using macroeconomic data and a New 
Keynesian model. As discussed below, Romalis (2007) finds, using microeconomic data and a 
trade model, that cross-country substitutability is between 6 and 11. 
 
Feenstra et al. (2014) find that the median estimates of micro elasticity, elasticity between 
different import suppliers, are between 3.2 and 4.1, whereas the median estimate of macro 
elasticity, elasticity between home and imported goods, is roughly one. In addition, cross-
country elasticity varies over time. Hooper et al. (2000) find that the sum of the elasticities for 
imports and exports is typically less than one in absolute value in the short term, but exceeds 
one after a while. The sum of the export and import elasticities equals cross-country 
substitutability in the current framework, as shown by Tille (2001). 
 
The trade policy literature has estimated the impact of tariff reductions on the growth of 
international trade, providing estimates of long-term cross-country substitutability. Head and 
Reis (2001) analyze the effects of the 1988 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement on trade 
volumes and prices. They find that trade liberalization leads to a substantial increase in trade 
and that cross-country substitutability is between 7 and 11. Romalis (2007) analyzes the effects 
of NAFTA’s and finds that the mean elasticity of substitution is between 6 and 11. These 
studies suggest that trade flows may be more responsive to permanent price movements than to 
temporary ones. Yi (2003), however, argues that the standard trade models fail to explain the 
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growth in trade without assuming a counterfactually large cross-country substitutability, and 
that vertical integration partly explains the growth in trade. This suggests that estimates of 
cross-country substitutability from trade liberalization episodes are likely to be unrealistically 
high. 
 
Our baseline choice for cross-country substitutability is 2. This value is in line with empirical 
(short-term) estimates and used in the international macroeconomics literature (e.g. in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 2007). We analyze the sensitivity of our main results as we vary cross-country 
substitutability from 0.5 to 11. 
 
The choice of tariff rate also warrants a more detailed explanation. First, tariff rates vary greatly 
across countries. Second, recent empirical estimates of effective tariff rates are rare. According 
to the World Bank (2014), the average (most-favored-nation applied and trade-weighted) 
nominal tariff rate for all products in OECD countries was 2.9% (1.7% for manufactured 
products) in 2012. The corresponding worldwide tariff rates were 4.0% and 3.4%. Effective 
rates, however, can differ from nominal ones. Deardorff and Stern (1984) found that the 
effective tariff rate in the European Union after the Tokyo round was roughly 8%, whereas the 
nominal rate was roughly 6%. This suggests that effective tariff rates are higher than nominal 
ones. Accordingly, we set the initial tariff rate to 4% in our baseline parameterization, which is 
somewhat higher than the OECD average. We analyze the sensitivity of the main results, setting 
the initial tariff rate in the 2% to 6% range. 
 
As noted earlier, the parameter governing the persistence of the change in tariff rate is set to one 
( 1 ). This implies that the changes in the tariff rates are permanent. The parameter t , used 
to model shifts in the tariff rate, is set such that we always analyze reduction in the tariff rate of 
a one percentage point. In the baseline parameterization (the tariff rate is four percent), this 
implies a reduction in the tariff rate of 25%. 
 
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply ( ) is a key parameter of the model. There is absolutely no 
consensus value for it. In a survey, Chetty et al. (2013) argued that micro evidence suggests that 
in macro models the Frisch elasticity (on the intensive margin) should be set to 0.5. Keane and 
Rogerson (2012) likewise surveyed the empirical literature and argued that the Frisch elasticity 
is in the range to 1 to 2 at the macro level. They also pointed out that it is typical to set the 
Frisch elasticity to this range in macro models. Our baseline value for   is 1. This value is near 
the middle of empirical estimates and is widely used in macro models. We, however, implement 
a sensitivity analysis to assess how responsive the main results are to changes in this parameter. 
 
The parameters ( and * ) governing (exogenous) home bias in consumption are set such that 
the import-to-GDP ratio is realistic. According to the World Bank (2014), the average import-
to-GDP ratio for OECD countries in 2003–2012 was 26%, while the worldwide number was 
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28%. We set α to 1.47. In addition, we assume that the share of imports is identical in both 
countries, thus 53.0/)1(*  nn . Our baseline parameterization, together with the fact 
that prices ( )(0 zp and )(
*
0 zp ) are normalized to 1 and the tariff rate is 4%, implies that the 
initial import-to-output ratio is 25%. This roughly matches the OECD average. This value is 
quite commonly used in the international macroeconomics literature (e.g., in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2007). The import-to-GDP ratio is, however, much smaller in several countries. For 
example, in the United States the ratio averaged 16% in 2003–2012. We analyze the sensitivity 
of the main results, setting the import-to-GDP ratio in the 15% to 30% percent range.4 
 
IV.   EFFECTS OF A UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION 
In this section, we examine the consequences of unexpected, unilateral trade liberalization 
implemented by the domestic country. The domestic tariff rate is cut from 4% to 3% in period 1. 
The international effects of a domestic tariff reduction appear in Figure 1. In all figures, the 
horizontal axes indicate time. The vertical axes typically show percentage deviations from the 
initial steady state. Changes in the bond holdings of domestic households (whose initial value is 
zero) are expressed as a deviation from initial consumption (Figure 1(f)). In addition, as 
discussed below, the value of trade liberalization (Figures 1(i) and 1(j)) is measured as a 
percentage of initial consumption. 
 
The domestic terms of trade (ToT), shown in Figure 1(g), are defined as the relative producer 
price of domestic exports in terms of imports. The domestic terms of trade deteriorates if the 
index falls. The change in the terms of trade is given by 
 
),(ˆˆ)(ˆˆ * zbEzboTT tttt   
 
where )(ˆ zbt  and )(ˆ* zbt are the Calvo-weighted prices of domestic and foreign goods (excluding 
tariffs), respectively, which can be expressed as  
 
)(ˆ)1()(ˆ)(ˆ 1 zpzbzb
h
ttt     
 
and 
 
)(ˆ)1()(ˆ)(ˆ ** 1
* zpzbzb fttt    . 
 
 
                                                 
4 We use the method of Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001) to simulate the model used here. 
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Figure 1. Effects of a Unilateral Domestic Tariff Reduction 
 
We adopt the view of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) that countries consider a trade agreement 
beneficial if it offers them greater welfare than they would enjoy without it. A trade agreement 
is therefore potentially beneficial only if unilateral trade policies lead to an inefficient 
equilibrium. The idea of a trade agreement is to remove inefficiencies that exist under unilateral 
trade policy so that countries can enjoy greater welfare. 
 
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), it is common—in macroeconomics—to evaluate 
the welfare cost of policy A relative to that of policy B by expressing the welfare difference as a 
percentage of consumption that households are willing to give up in order to be equally well off 
under policy A as under policy B. In this paper, we analyze the welfare benefit of a tariff 
reduction relative to a case with no tariff reduction. We measure the welfare benefit as a 
percentage of consumption that the household is willing to pay for a tariff reduction in order to 
render the household indifferent to the two cases. Reitz and Slopek (2005) find that imposing a 
tariff raises domestic welfare in the short term, but the long term effect is ambiguous. The 
finding that tariffs may affect welfare differently in the short term than in the long term compels 
us to study both the discounted present value (DPV) of trade liberalization and the evolution of 
welfare over time. 
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Welfare in the case with “no tariff reduction” (NTR) in period t is denoted by NTRtU , and let 
NTR
sC , )(zl NTRs be the associated consumption and labor supply:5 
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The welfare benefit of a tariff reduction (TR) relative to the “no tariff reduction” case in period 
t, holding labor supply constant, is defined as t . Welfare in the “tariff reduction” case in 
period t is denoted by TRtU . With t , it can be expressed as 
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We express the welfare benefit of a tariff reduction as a percentage (rather than as a fraction) of 
consumption. Solving for t yields 
 
].1))(1[exp(100  NTRtTRtDPV UU       (29) 
 
A first-order Taylor expansion of the utility function implies that the change in utility in period t 
is given by6 
 
)ˆˆ( 1100 tttt llCUUdU
 .       (30) 
 
The welfare level realized in the model is the one with a tariff reduction ( tTRt UU  ). In the case 
where the tariff rate remains constant, welfare in every period would remain at the initial level, 
implying that 0UU NTRt  . Using equation (30), equation (29) can be expressed as: 
 
                                                 
5 We motivate the demand for money using the money-in-the-utility function approach. As usual in the macro 
literature, however, we focus the welfare analysis on the real component of the utility function, ignoring the 
welfare effect of money balances. The derivation of the welfare results follows that of Tervala (2012). 
6 We use a first-order approximation of the utility function, whereas several authors who have used the method of 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) has focused on stabilization policy using stochastic models, implying that one 
should take into account the volatility of consumption and the labor supply. We focus on a policy which aims to 
increase consumption and the labor supply and solve the model around a perfect-foresight path. 
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].1)ˆˆ)(1[exp(100 110   ttt llC        (31) 
 
Equation (31) measures the percentage of initial consumption that the household is willing to 
pay for a tariff reduction in period t. This is referred to as the value of trade liberalization in the 
figures. Figure 1(i) shows that the value of a tariff reduction is negative for the home country, 
implying that domestic households are willing to bear a cost to avoid trade liberalization in all 
periods. 
 
The overall welfare effect is more important than the effect on one period’s welfare. The next 
step is to calculate the DPV of the welfare benefit of tariff reduction. The DPV of welfare in the 
“no tariff reduction” case is denoted by NTRDPVU  and  tsNTRsNTRs zlC )(, is the associated 
consumption and labor supply paths: 
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Welfare in the “tariff reduction” case is denoted by TRDPVU  The DPV of the welfare benefit of a 
tariff reduction relative to the “no tariff reduction” case is denoted by DPV .With this definition, 
welfare in the event of a tariff reduction, denoted by TRDPVU , can be expressed as 
 
NTR
DPVDPV
TR
DPV UU  )1log(1
1  .       (32) 
 
Expressing the welfare benefit of a tariff reduction as a percentage of consumption and solving 
for DPV yields 
 
].1))(1[exp(100  NTRDPVTRDPVDPV UU       (33) 
 
Following the same steps as those in the one-period case and using the DPV of the change in 
utility, equation (33) can be written as 
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Equation (34) measures the DPV of the welfare gain of a trade agreement as a percentage of 
initial consumption. This measures the welfare benefit as a percentage of consumption that the 
household is willing to pay for a tariff reduction in order to render the household indifferent to 
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the two cases. The value of trade liberalization worldwide measures the population-weighted 
average of the value of a tariff reduction 
 
*)1( DPVDPV
W
DPV nn   .        (35) 
 
In equation (35), superscript W denotes the world. 
 
Figure 1(a) shows that domestic trade liberalization increases output in the home country: in the 
first period output increases 0.24% while the long term effect is 0.13%. A domestic tariff 
reduction implies a smaller distortionary effect on the labor supply (recall equations (11) and 
(12)). A tariff reduction therefore increases domestic output, a finding that is consistent with 
those of Fender and Yip (2000) and Reitz and Slopek (2005), who find that imposing of a tariff 
decreases output. 
 
In his survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between international trade and 
economic performance, Singh (2010) concluded that the macroeconomic evidence clearly 
supports positive and significant effects of trade on output. Our model is consistent with this 
finding, as trade liberalization leads to more trade and higher output. It can be argued, however, 
that this empirical literature tells us little about the effects of trade policy on output, as discussed 
in Dollar and Kraay (2004). Their study of the consequences of changes in trade policy found 
that trade liberalization is strongly correlated with changes in economic growth. Our results are 
consistent with this finding, in so far as trade liberalization increases the level of output. In their 
survey of the evidence on the empirical effects of tariff reductions on employment (in 
developing countries), Cirera et al. (2013) found that, when openness indicators (a share of 
exports, imports or both, over GDP) are used as the trade policy proxy, more openness is 
associated with higher employment. 
 
Figure 1(i) indicates that the value of trade liberalization is negative for the home country. 
Domestic households are willing to pay part of their consumption to avoid trade liberalization 
despite an increase in output. In the model with imperfectly competitive economies and 
distortionary taxes, the levels of output and consumption are suboptimally low. Thus, a tariff 
reduction could increase these levels (of output and consumption) and bring them closer to the 
social optimum, thereby enhancing welfare. The deterioration in the domestic terms of trade, 
however, implies that trade liberalization increases in output with no equivalent increase in 
consumption. The value of unilateral trade liberalization is therefore negative. 
 
The domestic terms of trade deteriorate for two reasons. First, by reducing tariffs, the home 
country increases the worldwide demand for the goods that it imports. Therefore, trade 
liberalization increases the price of the home country’s imports. Second, an increase in the 
supply of domestic goods lowers their relative price. 
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As Figure 1(e) shows, the exchange rate depreciates (0.75%). The domestic terms of trade 
deterioration decrease (increase) in domestic (foreign) consumption. Therefore, the relative 
demand for domestic money weakens, causing a depreciation in the exchange rate. In addition, 
equation (13) shows that a domestic tariff reduction has a positive effect on the real domestic 
money supply. A lower tariff implies lower domestic prices, which increase the relative real 
money supply, which in turn reinforces the depreciation of the domestic currency. Depreciation 
in the exchange rate leads to an expenditure switching effect. Domestic goods become cheaper, 
and demand for them temporarily increases. This explains the temporary increase (decrease) in 
domestic (foreign) output relative to the new steady state. In the short term, in an effort to 
smooth consumption, domestic households save part of their income by running a (small) 
current account surplus. The surplus is reflected in the increase in the bond holdings (see Figure 
1(f)). 
 
There is almost no empirical evidence on the current account effects of trade liberalization. In a 
rare paper, Ju et al. (2012) used data on 28 episodes to determine that trade liberalization on 
average improves the current account (if liberalization reduces the capital intensity of the 
economy). For example, China’s trade liberalization (including accession to the WTO) in the 
beginning of the 2000s was associated with an improvement in the current account. 
 
The DPV of the welfare benefit of a tariff reduction is negative for the home country due to a 
fall in consumption resulting from a deterioration in the terms of trade. In addition, the DPV of 
the welfare benefit of trade liberalization for the foreign country and the world is positive: the 
foreign country and the world as a whole benefit from domestic trade liberalization. Our 
findings are directly related to the optimal tariff argument: a large country can improve its terms 
of trade by imposing a tariff, even if this reduces worldwide welfare. 
 
Fender and Yip (2000) found that, under flexible prices, imposing a permanent tariff most likely 
increases domestic steady-state utility. A sufficient condition for a positive welfare effect is that 
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods (equal to the price elasticity of 
demand) is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of consumption. According to Svensson and 
van Wijnbergen (1989), this implies that domestic and foreign goods are Edgeworth-Pareto 
complements. The assumption that the intertemporal elasticity of consumption is one would 
render the model compatible with a balanced growth path if trend technological progress was 
introduced into the model (see King, Plosser and Rebelo 1988). In addition, in the framework of 
Fender and Yip (2000), the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods must be 
greater than one in order to make the demand slope downward. Therefore, Fender and Yip 
(2000) in essence found that a tariff increases domestic welfare. In addition, they found that 
domestic tariffs reduce foreign and worldwide welfare. Our results are consistent with these 
findings. 
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Reitz and Slopek (2005) extended by the model of Fender and Yip (2000) with the current 
account adjustment and found that the short-term effect of the imposition of a tariff on welfare 
is positive, but the long-term effect is ambiguous. They also find that the DPV of the welfare 
effect is positive for the home country and negative for the foreign country and the world. The 
authors find that tariffs create a short-term current account deficit and that the need to pay 
interest rates abroad in the long term dampens the welfare benefit of improving the terms of 
trade. However, under no plausible parameter combinations do they show that the long-term 
welfare effect of imposing a tariff would be negative. In our model, the long-term welfare loss 
from the deterioration of the terms of trade dominates the long-term welfare benefits of extra 
consumption that the accumulated wealth can generate.7 
 
The international economics literature has shown that results can be sensitive to the value of 
cross-country substitutability, so we analyzed whether changes in cross-country substitutability 
would affect the value of trade liberalization. As discussed in Section 3, we varied cross-country 
substitutability from 0.5 to 11. In addition, we varied the initial tariff rate from 2% to 4%. The 
value of trade liberalization turned out to be negative (positive) for the home (foreign) country 
for all parameter combinations. In addition, when domestic and foreign goods are Edgeworth–
Pareto substitutes (ρ > 1)8, changes in the initial tariff level and cross-country substitutability 
have a minor quantitative impact on the value of a tariff reduction. 
 
As discussed earlier, the main finding of Fender and Yip (2000) is that a sufficient condition for 
a positive welfare effect from imposing of a tariff is that the elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated goods is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of consumption. We found that, 
using a framework in which cross-country substitutability can differ from within-country 
substitutability and even when domestic and foreign goods are Edgeworth-Pareto complements, 
the value of a tariff reduction is negative for the home country. Moreover, we found that the 
value of trade liberalization in such a case is more negative than under the baseline 
parameterization. A deterioration in the domestic terms of trade implies that consumption 
declines. When domestic and foreign goods are complements, domestic households do not shift 
consumption from domestic goods to foreign goods, but reduce their consumption of both 
domestic and foreign goods. Aggregate consumption thus falls by more than when domestic and 
                                                 
7 Hwang and Turnovsky (2013) analyze the macroeconomic effects of tariffs using an open-economy model and 
find that the short-term effects of unanticipated tariffs on welfare depend on the currency of export pricing, the 
monetary policy rule, the share of non-traded goods in the consumption basket and the share of exports in total 
production. However, they do not show that even the short-term welfare effect of an increase in tariff would be 
negative under plausible parameter combinations. 
8 The assumption of log utility implies that the intertemporal elasticity of consumption is one. Therefore, domestic 
and foreign goods are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes (complements) in our model when ρ > 1 (ρ < 1). 
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foreign goods are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes. Consequently, the value of trade liberalization 
for a domestic (foreign) country is more negative (positive) than under the baseline case. 
  
As usual in the international economics literature, the current account response depends on 
whether the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (in the current framework, this requires that ρ 
> 1). The assumption of ρ = 0.5 therefore reverses the behavior of the current account, and trade 
liberalization brings about a current account deficit. This, however, does not affect the DPV of a 
tariff reduction, because current account imbalances optimally smooth over household 
consumption. 
 
The main conclusion of this section, that the value of a domestic tariff reduction is negative for 
the home country and positive for the foreign country and the world, is a robust finding. In our 
model, therefore, the two countries have no incentive to implement unilateral trade 
liberalization. 
V.   VALUE OF WTO TRADE AGREEMENTS 
This section analyzes the main theme of the paper—the value of WTO trade agreements. One of 
the main objectives of the WTO is reciprocal trade liberalization. In this paper, we use the term 
reciprocity with the same meaning as defined in Bagwell and Staiger (2002): “[M]utual 
adjustments in trade policy conform to the principle of reciprocity if these policy adjustments 
bring about changes in the volume of each country’s imports that are of equal value to changes 
in the volume of its exports.” (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 6). 
 
It is useful to make a distinction between bound and applied tariff rates. According to the WTO 
(2014), “bound rates are the ceiling rates as listed in members’ “schedules” or lists of 
commitments”, whereas “applied rates are the rates members currently charge, which can be 
lower than the bound rates”. In this section, we analyze the international effects of a WTO 
agreement which leads to a one percentage point reduction in the applied tariff rate in both 
countries, i.e., the tariff rate is reduced from 4% to 3% in the both countries. This satisfies the 
principle of reciprocity: trade liberalization causes equal changes in export and import volumes 
in the both countries. 
 
The effects of this exercise appear in Figure 2 and Table 2. Figure 2 shows that because 
countries and shocks are identical, multilateral trade liberalization increases domestic and 
foreign output by the same amount.9 Output increases by 0.21% in the first period and 0.13% in 
the long term. As discussed in Section 4, a tariff reduction reduces tax distortions on the labor 
supply. The fact that output increases more in the short term than in the long term is caused by 
                                                 
9 The only asymmetry in the model is that the bond is denominated in the domestic currency. This does matter 
because the nominal interest rate is identical in both countries. 
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changes in the real wage. In the long term, prices are higher due to an increase in output. In the 
short term, only a fraction of firms are able to raise their prices. Consequently, real wages are 
temporarily high in the short term, creating a stronger incentive to work. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Reciprocal Trade Liberalization 
 
Reciprocal trade liberalization, together with the fact that the countries are identical, implies that 
the responses of output and consumption are identical across countries. Identical changes in the 
supply and demand for goods in both countries imply that the terms of trade remain constant. In 
addition, the exchange rate also remains constant, because changes in the demand and supply 
for (real) money are identical across countries. 
 
Figure 2(f) shows that domestic and foreign households are willing to pay 0.02% of their initial 
consumption for a tariff reduction in the first period. This figure shows that reciprocal trade 
liberalization benefits both countries. Table 2 shows the DPV of a trade agreement.10 In an 
imperfectly competitive economy, an increase in output, which causes an identical increase in 
consumption, brings both consumption and output closer to their efficient levels, thereby 
increasing welfare. If a country implements a unilateral tariff reduction, it experiences a 
deterioration in its terms of trade, as discussed earlier. This reduces welfare, despite an increase 
in output. Nevertheless, countries have an incentive for multilateral trade liberalization. A 
multilateral tariff reduction brings output and consumption closer to their efficient levels, such 
that a deterioration in the terms of trade does not offset the benefits of higher output. A WTO 
                                                 
10 We calculate the DPV using 1,000 periods. 
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trade agreement, therefore, offers countries a means to escape from the prisoner’s dilemma, 
driven by manipulation of the terms of trade. Table 2 shows that, under the baseline 
parameterization, domestic and foreign households would be willing to pay 1.3% of their initial 
consumption for a trade agreement, in order to remain as well off with the trade agreement case 
as without it. This means that WTO trade agreements are valuable. The policy implication is 
that completion of the Doha Round should be a high priority. 
 
Table 2. DPV of a WTO Trade Agreement as the Percentage of Consumption 
 Initial tariff rate 
Cross-country 
substitutability 
2 4 (baseline) 6 
5.0  1.3 1.3 1.3 
1.1  1.3 1.3 1.3 
2 (baseline) 1.3 1.3 1.3 
5  1.3 1.3 1.3 
11  1.3 1.3 1.3 
 
As mentioned in Section 3, the main results are potentially sensitive to the value of cross-
country substitutability. However, Table 2 shows that it has (virtually) no impact on the value of 
a trade agreement. In addition, the effect of the initial tariff level on the value of a trade 
agreement is negligible. 
 
Next, we analyze the role of the degree of openness. Table 3 shows that the value of a trade 
agreement is sensitive to changes in the import-to-GDP ratio. When the import-to-GDP ratio is 
15%, the welfare gain from a trade agreement is 0.76% of initial consumption. The smaller the 
import-to-GDP ratio is, the smaller the welfare gains from a trade agreement. 
 
Table 3. Import-to-GDP Ratio and the Value of a WTO Trade Agreement 
Import-to-GDP 
Ratio 
15% 20% 25% 
(baseline) 
30% 
Value of an 
Agreement 
0.76 1.0 1.3 1.6 
 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) developed a new trade model that can convincingly quantify the 
welfare gains of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization. They calibrated the multi-
country model with data from 19 OECD countries for the year 1990. For example, the tariff rate 
was set to 5%, based on the OECD average at that time. Eaton and Kortum found that a 
unilateral tariff removal by the United States causes a welfare loss in that country, due a 
deterioration of the terms of trade, while all other countries benefit. The multilateral elimination 
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of tariffs improves welfare. Eaton and Kortum did not show their results for all countries, but 
they mentioned that (in case of immobile labor) the welfare gains never exceed 0.5%. 
 
Caliendo and Parro (2015) developed a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian model to explore 
quantitatively the welfare effects of tariff reductions caused by NAFTA. They found that 
NAFTA has increased Mexico’s welfare by a range of 1.17% to 1.31% and the United States’ 
welfare by 0.08%, whereas Canada’s welfare has declined by 0.06%. 
 
Ossa (2011) developed the relocation theory of the WTO, using a new trade model in which 
firms produce differentiated goods that they can sell on the domestic and foreign market. In this 
model, entry is free and exporting is costly. If the home country imposes a tariff, foreign firms 
relocate to the home country. This relocation implies that domestic households save trade costs 
and local prices drop, which increases domestic welfare. Foreign welfare decreases as local 
prices increase due to trade costs. Policy makers maximize welfare that depends solely on 
consumption. This leads them to maximize the number of domestic manufacturing firms (jobs). 
Ossa found that reciprocity can be interpreted as simple rules that help countries to neutralize 
the production relocation effect. Using a multi-country model, he found that reciprocal trade 
liberalization, under which countries implement tariff changes that maximize the mean welfare 
change, led to a mean welfare gain of just 0.09% to 0.11%.This finding led Ossa (2011) to 
conclude that the gains from WTO negotiations are moderate. 
 
Ossa (2014) quantitatively analyzed non-cooperative and cooperative trade policy in a 
framework that featured the terms of trade effect, the production relocation effect and the 
political economy effect. He calibrated the multi-country, multi-industry general equilibrium 
model to match the features of seven countries and regions (Brazil, China, the European Union, 
India, Japan, the United States and the rest of the world), chosen to comprise the main players in 
WTO negotiations, in the year 2007. He found that in the cases where initial tariff rates were set 
to match factual rates, the average welfare gain of a WTO trade agreement was 0.5%. 
 
Our main results contrast sharply with the above-mentioned trade literature. Eaton and Kortum 
(2002), Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2011 and 2014) found that a trade agreement that 
leads to the elimination (or a notable reduction) of tariffs yields smaller welfare improvements. 
In our model, the welfare gain of a trade agreement, which reduces tariffs by just one 
percentage point, is 0.76% to 1.6% of consumption (see Table 2). An elimination of tariffs 
would lead to even greater welfare gains. The gains of WTO agreements are therefore 
substantial. 
 
Several potential reasons may explain the substantial difference in the main results. The first is 
the method of welfare analysis. We calculated consumption compensation necessary for 
households to be as well off in the trade agreement case as without it, whereas Eaton and 
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Kortum (2002), Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2011 and 2014) calculated change in 
welfare. The method, however, cannot explain the differences, because in our model the DPV of 
a change in utility (in percentages) is almost the same as the DPV of the welfare gain in terms of 
initial consumption. 
 
The second potential explanation is the degree of openness. We set the import-to-GDP to match 
the OECD average in 2003–2012. Eaton and Kortum (2002), for example, used bilateral data of 
manufacturing trade between 19 OECD countries in 1990, when the import-to-GDP ratio in the 
OECD countries was 18%. The degree of openness, however, cannot account for the difference. 
As mentioned earlier, Eaton and Kortum (2002) found that multilateral elimination of the initial 
tariff of 5% causes welfare gains that never exceed 0.5%. In our model, when the import-to-
GDP ratio is 15%, the welfare gain of the multilateral elimination of the initial tariffs of 5% is 
as high as 3.8% of consumption. 
 
One innovation of our model, relative to the existing models that have been used in the literature 
on trade agreements, is to introduce transitional dynamics with the introduction of staggered 
price setting. This is the third potential explanation for the difference in the main results. With 
flexible prices, the economies would jump instantly to the new steady state. Figure 2(e) shows 
that the value of a trade agreement is higher in the short term than in the long term. Therefore, 
the introduction of staggered price setting increases the DPV of a trade agreement. As discussed 
earlier, real wages are temporarily high in the short term, creating a stronger incentive to work. 
This brings the economy in the short term closer to the efficient level of output, thus increasing 
welfare, relative to the new steady state. 
 
Staggered price setting, however, cannot account for the differences in the results. In an 
alternative scenario, we set the price rigidity parameter to zero, implying that prices are fully 
flexible. This reduces the DPV of a trade agreement to 1.28%, while the value is 1.31% under 
the baseline parameterization. 
 
Another main innovation of this model, relative to the existing models in the literature on trade 
agreements, is to change the underlying steady state of the trade models by introducing a 
different market structure from the one usually assumed. The fourth potential explanation is 
therefore the presence of imperfect substitutability between goods within the same 
country/industry. On one hand, Table 2 shows that the value of a trade agreement is (virtually) 
the same if cross-country substitutability equals within-country substitutability. On the other 
hand, the degree of imperfect competition within the country/industry (within-country 
substitutability) has an effect on the initial level of output: The lower within-country 
substitutability is, the lower the initial level of output. As mentioned in Section 3, within-
country substitutability does not influence the response of endogenous variables. However, the 
lower within-country substitutability is, the more an identical increase in output and 
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consumption (of given size) increases welfare. Therefore, the welfare gains of trade 
liberalization depend on the degree of within-country substitutability. 
 
Within-country substitutability—in quantitative macroeconomics—is virtually always set 
between 6 and 20, implying a price markup of 20% and 5%, respectively. However, Eaton and 
Kortum (2002), Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2011 and 2014) assume perfect 
competition within the industry, implying that within-country substitutability is very high. 
When within-country substitutability gets larger and goods produced in the same country 
become close substitutes, the producers’ monopoly power declines. We also look at the limiting 
case of almost perfect competition, by checking the implications of setting within-country 
substitutability to the value of 100, implying a low price markup of roughly 1%. 
 
Table 4 demonstrates the dependence of the value of a trade agreement on within-country 
substitutability and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Row 3 of Table 4 shows the 
consequences of varying within-country substitutability, holding the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply at 1. The benefit of a trade agreement is significantly reduced when goods produced in 
the same country become close substitutes )100(  . The welfare gain then falls to 0.26% of 
consumption. This is one-fifth of the gain under the baseline parameterization. In any case, the 
quantitative difference between our results and those of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo and 
Parro (2015) and Ossa (2011 and 2014) is striking. 
 
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of Within-Country Substitutability and the Frisch 
Elasticity of Labor Supply  
Row  6  11  
(baseline) 
20  100  
1 1.0  0.43 0.25 0.15 0.050 
2 5.0  1.5 0.88 0.52 0.18 
3 1
(baseline) 
2.3 1.3 0.78 0.26 
4 2  3.1 1.7 1.0 0.35 
 
The public economics literature has shown that optimal taxation depends notably on the effects 
of taxation on aggregate labor supply. Trade models that have been used to analyze the gains of 
multilateral tariff reductions, however, typically assume that household labor supply is 
exogenous. In those models, the utility function depends solely on consumption. A distinctive 
feature of our model is the endogeneity of labor supply. Therefore, we analyze how sensitive the 
main results are to changes in the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. As mentioned in Section 3, 
Keane and Rogerson (2012) argued that the Frisch elasticity could be as high as 2, whereas 
Chetty et al. (2013) argued that it should be set to 0.5. We use this range in the sensitivity 
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analysis. In addition, we set the Frisch elasticity to 0.1 to discuss the implications of the 
endogeneity of labor supply to the value of trade agreements. 
 
Table 4 shows that the higher the Frisch elasticity is, the larger the welfare gains of a trade 
agreement. This is because with higher elasticity of labor supply households respond to a tariff 
cut by further increasing their labor supply. This brings consumption and output of an 
imperfectly competitive economy closer to their efficient levels, thereby increasing welfare. If 
the Frisch elasticity is 0.5 (2), the value of a trade agreement drops (increases) to 0.88% (1.7%) 
of initial consumption, when within-country substitutability is 11. The welfare gain seems 
implausibly high (3.1% of consumption) when within-country substitutability is 6 and the Frisch 
elasticity is 2. We would like to stress in this connection than the consensus among 
economists—in particular among labor economists—is that the Frisch elasticity is smaller than 
2. Table 4 shows that for the realistic parameter combinations of the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply and within-country substitutability, the value of the welfare gain of a trade agreement, 
which cuts tariffs by one percentage point, is 0.5% to 2% of initial consumption. 
 
Our main results contrast sharply with those of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo and Parro 
(2015) and Ossa (2011 and 2014) as long as the Frisch elasticity and within-country 
substitutability are within the range of empirical estimates. However, our results are consistent 
with earlier studies, in cases where the Frisch elasticity is very low )1.0(   and within-
country substitutability ( 20  or 100) is high. In these cases, reciprocal trade liberalization 
that eliminates 4% tariffs induces welfare gains of 0.2% to 0.6% of initial consumption. In 
comparison, Eaton and Kortum (2002) found that the multilateral elimination of 5% tariffs 
yields welfare gains that never exceed 0.5%. Caliendo and Parro (2015) discovered that the 
welfare effects of tariff reductions caused by NAFTA are on average 0.42%. Ossa (2014) found 
that the average welfare gain of a trade agreement that eliminates factual tariffs is 0.5%.  
 
The main source of the differences between our results and those Eaton and Kortum (2002), 
Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2014) on the benefits of multilateral trade liberalization is 
the combination of the degree of within-country substitutability and the magnitude of the labor 
supply response to a tariff reduction. Our results suggest that for the realistic parameter 
combinations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and within-country substitutability, the 
welfare gains of trade agreements are much larger than in recent trade models. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper quantifies the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral tariff reductions in a two-
county model that combines Armington and New Keynesian elements. The Armington element, 
in which international trade takes place because goods are differentiated by the country of 
origin, is familiar in models that have been used in the literature on trade agreements. Staggered 
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price adjustment, endogenous labor supply and the presence of imperfect substitutability 
between goods produced within the country are the most important features of the model. 
 
We set the parameters of the model to reflect existing tariff rates and import-to-GDP ratios in 
the OECD countries in order to derive the main results. Our findings show that the value of a 
WTO trade agreement depends significantly on within-country substitutability and the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply. Our view is that for realistic parameter combinations, the value of the 
welfare gain of a trade agreement, which cuts tariffs by one percentage point, is 0.5% to 2% of 
initial consumption. Our main results contrast sharply with Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo 
and Parro (2015) and Ossa (2014), who find that multilateral trade liberalization yields 
considerably smaller welfare gains. We conclude that WTO trade agreements are of high value, 
with the implication that completion of the Doha Round should be a high priority. 
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